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Abstract. Remote user authentication has found numerous real-world
applications, especially in a user-server model. In this work, we intro-
duce the notion of anonymous remote user authentication with k-times
untraceability (k-RUA) for a given parameter k, where authorized users
authenticate themselves to an authority (typically a server) in an anony-
mous and k-times untraceable manner. We define the formal security
models for a generic k-RUA construction that guarantees user authen-
ticity, anonymity and user privacy. We provide a concrete instantiation
of k-RUA having the following properties: 1) a third party cannot im-
personate an authorized user by producing valid transcripts for the user
while conversing during a session; 2) a third party having access to the
communication channel between the user and the authority cannot iden-
tify the session participants; 3) the authority can trace the real identities
of dishonest users who have authenticated themselves for more than k
times; 4) our k-RUA construction avoids using expensive pairing opera-
tions — which makes it efficient and suitable for devices having limited
amount of computational resources.
Keywords: Remote User Authentication, Anonymity, User Privacy, k-
times Untraceability
1 Introduction
User authentication is typically the first line of defense in most of the secure
information systems. In the well-known user-server setting, a user has to au-
thenticate herself to a (possibly remote) authentication server before opting for
the services. Moreover, in order to protect a legitimate user’s privacy, anony-
mous user authentication is widely studied in the literature and is deployed in
numerous real-world applications. Researchers have come up with several solu-
tions that exploit cryptographic techniques, such as group signatures [2], blind
signatures and ring signatures [16], to ensure (or enhance) privacy. On the other
2hand, in some applications, it is required that a legitimate user can authenticate
herself (and benefit from the services) for a limited number of times. For exam-
ple, systems like e-cash, e-coupon and e-voting need such privacy guarantees. In
such scenarios, k-times anonymous authentication (k-TAA) [14, 13, 3] serves the
purpose. It is a fine-grained approach for privacy protection which ensures that a
legitimate user can be authenticated anonymously only up to k number of times
(for a threshold parameter k). On the other hand, if a user tries to authenticate
herself beyond the threshold k, then her anonymity is compromised.
Although k-TAA schemes address the issue of restricting a user to bounded
number of authentications, k-TAA is not suitable for building an authentica-
tion system for a mobile platform due to the following reasons. First, the tra-
ditional (and more generic) user authentication system involves an authentica-
tion server and multiple independent users, whereas k-TAA requires an extra
(trusted) group manager. For example, it is cumbersome for a mobile device
user if she has to consult a third party every time she enrolls to (or logs into)
a server. Second, a mobile-platform-based system usually employs devices with
low-power and limited resources, whereas k-TAA requires certain computation-
intensive operations such as pairings (bilinear maps) and proofs of knowledge.
Thus, to achieve both anonymity and traceability in a secure mobile setting is a
non-trivial task.
In this work, we aim to design an efficient anonymous remote user authen-
tication system suitable for mobile devices with a guarantee that a dishonest
user deviating from the correct execution of the protocol can be traced. We ex-
plore whether we can exploit an e-coupon1/e-cash system to construct an anony-
mous remote user authentication system with traceability. We observe that an
e-coupon system is more suitable than an e-cash system due to the following
reasons. Unlike a bank, an e-coupon system, in general, does not involve central
authority (group manager), which is required in an e-cash system in order to gen-
erate coins for the users. Moreover, e-cash system usually uses more expensive
algorithms/protocols than e-coupon system. The deployment of mobile e-coupon
systems [9] has showed their viability in practice. In the e-coupon system, the
issue2 protocol between a user and the vendor (service provider) can be applied
to the enrollment phase of user authentication. On the other hand, the redeem
protocol involves checking the authenticity of coupons, and certain services are
redeemed in case coupons are valid. We do not consider whether the services are
provided or not; we only focus on checking the authenticity of coupons in the
user authentication setting as the goal of authentication server is to authenticate
a legitimate (or authorized) user only.
We note that a secure and anonymous remote user authentication with trace-
ability cannot be simply built upon existing e-coupon systems. The main con-
cerns of existing e-coupon systems [6, 12, 5, 1, 10] can be listed as follows: un-
forgeability, double-redemption detection, unlinkability and unsplittability. The
1 An e-coupon is also sometimes named as a multi-coupon as such a coupon can be
redeemed more than once [6].
2 An e-coupon system is usually comprised of issue and redeem protocols [6].
3e-coupon system proposed by Liu et al. [11] has a new property: “k-times re-
demption detection” while the basic security requirements mentioned above are
also met. Specifically, the real identity of a dishonest user can be traced by the
service provider if the user tries to redeem the coupon more than k times —
which aligns with our design goal. However, contrary to their claims, their e-
coupon system fails to achieve traceability since a dishonest user in their system
can misuse coupon without being detected.
1.1 This work
In this work, we introduce the notion of anonymous remote user authentication
with k-times untraceability (k-RUA) that enables authorized users to authenti-
cate themselves to a remote authentication server anonymously and ensures the
traceability to detect dishonest users. Our contributions can be summarized as
follows.
– We present the formal security definitions for privacy-preserving remote user
authentication. In particular, we propose a user authenticity model to capture
impersonation attacks, an anonymity model to address an honest-but-curious3
authentication server and a user privacy to ensure the privacy of protocol
participants.
– We present the first generic construction of k-RUA, which is built upon a
secure e-coupon system. We prove it can achieve user authenticity, anonymity
and user privacy. In particular, k-times untraceability enables an authorized
user to authenticate herself to an authentication server up to k times without
being traced. The real identity of a dishonest user is revealed to the authen-
tication server in case the user tries to authenticate for more than k times.
– We show that the e-coupon system proposed in [11] fails to achieve their
claimed k-times redemption detection. We fix their e-coupon system in our
proposed k-RUA. In addition, we show that the same attacks are applicable
to their previous work [10] and we also fix it accordingly.
1.2 Related Work
k-Times Anonymous Authentication. Teranishi et al. [14] proposed the first
authentication scheme which allows users to anonymously perform the authenti-
cation at most k times (k-TAA). In particular, a user’s identity is fully protected
within the k-times authentication, while anyone is able to trace a dishonest user
trying to authenticate herself beyond the allowable k times. Later on, dynamic
k-TAA (denote k-TAA′) schemes were proposed in the literature [13, 3] that al-
low the service provider to independently grant/revoke a user from his access
group in order to have better control over their clients. We note that some con-
structions [13, 3] were based on expensive pairings (bilinear maps), which are
not suitable for devices with limited resources.
3 The authentication server is assumed to execute the protocol as specified, just try
to learn additional information from the transcript during protocol execution.
4E-coupon System. The privacy-preserving e-coupon system was first proposed
by Chen et al. [6] that allows a user purchase e-coupons and redeem them un-
linkably. Furthermore, the number of redemptions remaining can be hidden from
the vendor (i.e., coupon issuer). To reduce the cost for issuing and redeeming
coupons, Nguyen [12] proposed an efficient e-coupon system which has constant
communication and computation costs (that does not scale with the redemption
limit k). Nguyen’s e-coupon system also allows the coupon issuer to revoke an e-
coupon. In an independent work [5], Canard et al. proposed an e-coupon system
that is more efficient than [6]. They added new features to an e-coupon system
that include the following: a user can choose the number of coupons she wants
to issue; a user can choose the value of each coupon from a set of pre-defined
values.
Armknecht et al. [1] proposed an e-coupon system that takes into account
multiple vendors. Specifically, a user can redeem multiple coupons anonymously
with different vendors in an arbitrary order. This system prevents double-spending
by maintaining a trusted database that records the transaction of each redeemed
coupon. Liu et al. [10] proposed a pairing-free e-coupon system that achieves both
traceability against dishonest users and anonymity (i.e., untraceable) for honest
users without involving any trusted third party.
In a recent work, Liu et al. [11] introduced a new notion called “strong user
privacy”, i.e., the privacy of the service chosen by a user during the redemption
process (user redemption privacy). To meet strong user privacy requirements,
they rely on an existing oblivious transfer scheme [7]. We also notice that the
vendor can easily link two redemptions since a single coupon is issued by each
user. However, the vendor cannot trace the real identities of honest users as long
as the number of redemptions does not exceed k.
2 Security Model
Notation. We define a system with n users. We denote the i-th session es-
tablished by a user U as ΠiU , and identities of all the users recognised by Π
i
U
during the execution of that session by partner identifier pidiU . We define sid
i
U
as the unique session identifier belonging to the session i established by the user
U . Specifically, sidiU = {mj}nj=1, where mj ∈ {0, 1}∗ is the message transcript
among users.
We say an oracle ΠiU may be used or unused. The oracle is considered as
unused if it has never been initialized. The oracle is initialized as soon as it be-
comes part of a group. After the initialisation the oracle is marked as used and
turns into the stand-by state where it waits for an invocation to execute a pro-
tocol operation. Upon receiving such invocation the oracle ΠiU learns its partner
identifier pidiU and turns into a processing state where it sends, receives and pro-
cesses messages according to the description of the protocol. During that phase,
the internal state information stateiU is maintained by the oracle. The oracle Π
i
U
remains in the processing state until it collects enough information to finalise
5the user authentication. As soon as the authentication is accomplished ΠiU ac-
cepts and terminates the protocol execution meaning that it would not send
or receive further messages. If the protocol execution fails then ΠiU terminates
without being accepted.
2.1 System Model
A remote user authentication with k-times untraceability (k-RUA) involves two
types of entities: multiple enorlled users and an authentication server. We define
a k-RUA protocol that consists of the following algorithms/protocols:
– Setup: The authentication server S takes the security parameter λ as input,
outputs the master public/secret key pair (mpk, msk).
– KeyGen: User takes master public key mpk as input, outputs a public/secret
key pair (pk, sk).
– Enrollment: This is an interactive protocol that runs between an enrolled user
and an authentication server S over a public channel. The enrolled user will
generate a credential and become an authorized user after enrollment.
– Authentication: This is an interactive protocol between an authorized user and
an authentication server S over a public channel. An authorized user sends
her credential and k-size commitments to S, while S accept it if and only if
the credential send is valid.
– k-Times Untraceability: The authentication server S takes k+1 authentication
transcripts of one user as input, outputs the user’s secret key sk.
2.2 Security Model
User Authenticity. Informally, an adversary A attempts to impersonate an
authorized user and authenticate to an authentication server4. We define a formal
authenticity game between a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A
and a simulator (i.e., challenger) S below.
– Setup. S generates a master public/secret key pair (mpk, msk) for authentica-
tion server S and public/secret key pairs (pki, ski) for n users by running the
corresponding KeyGen algorithms. In addition, S honestly generates credential
si for n users by running the Enrollment protocol. Eventually, S sends user’s
identity/credential {IDi, si} and server’s identity IDS to A.
– Training. A can make the following queries in arbitrary sequence to S.
• Send: If A issues a send query in the form of (U, i,m) to simulate a network
message for the i-th session of user U , then S would simulate the reaction of
instance oracle ΠiU upon receiving message m, and return to A the response
that ΠiU would generate; If A issues a send query in the form of (U ′, ‘start’),
then S creates a new instance oracle ΠiU ′ and returns to A the first protocol
message.
4 This is a modified version of user authenticity model [15] in the remote user authen-
tication setting.
6• Secret Key Reveal: If A issues a secret key reveal (or corrupt, for short)
query to user i, then S will return the secret key ski to A.
• Master Secret Key Reveal: If A issues a master secret key reveal query to S,
then S returns the master secret key msk to A.
• State Reveal: If A issues a state reveal query to (possibly unaccepted) in-
stance oracle ΠjUi (j 6= i), then S will return all internal state values con-
tained in ΠjUi at the moment the query is asked.
– Challenge. A wins the game if all of the following conditions hold.
1. S accept user i; It implies pidsS and sid
s
S exist.
2. A did not issue Master Secret Key Reveal query to S;
3. m ∈ sidsS, but there exists no ΠsUi which has sent m (m denotes the message
transcript from user i).
Note that A is allowed to reveal all user’s secret keys. We define the advantage
of an adversary A in the above game as
AdvA(λ) = |Pr[A wins]|.
Definition 1. We say a k-RUA protocol has user authenticity if for any PPT
A, Advk-RUAA (λ) is a negligible function of the security parameter λ.
Anonymity. Informally, an adversary (e.g., authentication server) is not al-
lowed to identify who are the authenticated users, with the condition that au-
thorized users authenticate themselves to authentication server within k times.
We define a game between an insider adversary A and a simulator S below.
– Setup: S generates a master public/secret key pair (mpk, msk) for authentica-
tion server S and public/secret key pairs (pki, ski) for n users by running the
corresponding KeyGen algorithms. In addition, S honestly generates a k-size
set of credentials {si} for each user by running the Enrollment protocol. Even-
tually, S sends user’s identities/credential sets {IDi, si} and server’s master
public/secret key pairs (mpk, msk) to A. S also tosses a random coin b which
will be used later in the game.
– Training: A interacts with all users via a set of oracle queries (as defined in
the user authenticity model). Eventually, A outputs two new distinct users
(ID0, ID1), while S generates two credential sets {s0}, {s1} for users (ID0, ID1)
by running the Enrollment protocol.
– Challenge: A is given one of challenge credential sets {sb}, and A continues to
interact with all users (include two new users ID0, ID1) via all oracle queries
until it terminates and outputs bit b′.
Note that A is allowed to activate at most k sessions for ID0 or ID1 during
Challenge stage, and A is not allowed to reveal the secret keys of ID0 and
ID1. We define the advantage of A in the above game as
AdvA(λ) = |Pr[S → 1]− 1/2|.
Definition 2. We say a k-RUA protocol has anonymity if for any PPT A,
AdvA(λ) is a negligible function of the security parameter λ.
7User Privacy. Informally, an adversary (e.g., non-authorized user) is not al-
lowed to identify who are the session participants. We define a game between an
outsider adversary A and a simulator S below:
– Setup: S generates a master public/secret key pair (mpk, msk) for S and pub-
lic/secret key pairs (pki, ski) for n users by running the corresponding KeyGen
algorithms. In addition, S honestly generates credential si for each user by
running the Enrollment protocol. Eventually, S sends user’s identity/credential
{IDi, si} and server’s identity IDS to A. S also tosses a random coin b which
will be used later in the game. We denote the original n users set as U .
– Training: A is allowed to issue Send, State Reveal queries and at most n-2
Secret Key Reveal queries to S. In particular, A is not allowed to issue Master
Secret Key Reveal query to S. We denote the honest (i.e., uncorrupted) user
set as U ′.
– Challenge: S randomly selects two users ID0, ID1 ∈ U ′ as challenge candi-
dates, and S removes them from U ′ and simulates ID∗b by either ID∗b = ID1
if b = 1 or ID∗b = ID0 if b = 0.
Let authentication server S interact with user ID∗b . A can access all the com-
munication transcripts among them.
S↔ ID∗b =
{
ID1 b = 1
ID0 b = 0
Finally, A outputs b′ as its guess for b. If b′ = b, then S outputs 1; otherwise,
S outputs 0.
We define the advantage of A in the above game as
AdvA(λ) = Pr[S → 1]− 1/2.
Definition 3. We say a k-RUA protocol has anonymity if for any PPT A,
AdvA(λ) is a negligible function of the security parameter λ.
3 Security Risks of E-coupon Systems [10, 11]
We notice that the privacy-preserving e-coupon systems in [10, 11] include two
important primitives: a new blind signature scheme and an existing oblivious
transfer scheme [7]. The blind signature aims to achieve user’s anonymity (i.e.,
untraceability) with respect to service provider, which is the target of subsequent
attacks. That is, the dishonest users may misuse a valid coupon and successfully
avoid the Reveal algorithm. To show the potential security risks of [10] and its
extension [11], we just review the extended e-coupon system [11]. Note that the
detailed description of extended e-coupon system is referred to [11], and the
notation below will mostly follow the notation in [10, 11].
Concrete Attacks. By summarising the security risks in [11], we classify two
types of adversaries. The goal for both of them is to avoid their Reveal algorithm
and misuse a valid coupon. Below we present the detailed attacks respectively.
8– Type one. The target is user’s secret key. In the issue stage, user receives values
(δ1 = pk
k′
U , δ2 = g
k′) from S. However, a dishonest user U can replace her secret
key x to x′ and ask S to blindly sign it. Specifically, a dishonest user computes
α = (gx
′y)x1 , β = (gx
′
)x1 , λ = gx1 , and m = H1(α, β, λ), r = m · βa · δ′b·x1/a1
where δ′1 = g
k·x′ . Eventually, user stores (α, β, λ, r, s) as a valid coupon after
interaction with S. Note that α, β, r are generated using the new secret key
x′.
Notice that a dishonest user is allowed to modify the value δ1 (to δ
′
1) and pass
the verification of blinded signature successfully: H1(α, β, λ)
?
=β−s·αH2(H1(α,β,λ),r)·
r. In the reveal stage, the secret value x1 will be revealed with regard to a
misbehaving user. However, S could not determine the identity of dishonest
user in its database since pkx1U 6= β(= gx1·x
′
).
– Type two. The target is the chosen randomness. In the issue stage, a dishonest
user computes λ = gx
′
1 (rather than λ = gx1) using a different randomness and
generates other parameters honestly using the randomness x1. In the reveal
stage, a secret value x′1 will be revealed with regard to a misbehaving user U .
However, S could not determine the identity of dishonest user in its database
since pk
x′1
U 6= β(= gx1·x). Note that the randomness in λ is different from the
randomness in α, β, r.
Same attack can be applied to [10]. If a dishonest user redeems a coupon twice,
(R1 = x
′
1 + c1 · x1 · x,R2 = x′1 + c2 · x1 · x), then S is not able to obtain the
secret key x (what S can obtain is a value x1 · x).
4 Proposed Construction
A user obtains her credential after interacting with an authentication server S
during Enrollment stage. Later, S acknowledges an authorized user’s authenticity
during Authentication stage if and only if the user authenticates with a valid
credential. In particular, S is able to link the authorized user’s credential with
commitments at most k times. If an authorized user authenticates herself to S
for k+1 times, then S can identify the real identity of the user.
– Setup: The authentication server S takes the security parameter λ as input
and outputs the master secret key msk = (y, e, f) and the master public key
mpk = (gy, g1 = g
e, g2 = g
f , gy1 , g
y
2 ). S also generates the hash functions H1 :
{0, 1}∗ → G, H2 : G → Zq. S chooses a public key encryption (PKE) scheme
(e.g., [8]) for the system.
– KeyGen: The user i chooses the secret key ski = x ∈ Zq and computes the
public key pki = g
x
1 .
– Enrollment: The user i and the authentication server S interact with each other
as described below
• Upon receiving a request from the user i, S chooses a random element
K ∈R Zq, computes (δ1 = gK, δ2 = (gx1 · g2)K) and sends them to the user i;
• The user i chooses x1, a, b ∈R Zq and computes α = (gx1 · g2)y·x1 , β =
(gx1 · g2)x1 . Then, the user i computes m = H1(α||β), r = m · βa · δb·x12 ,m′ =
H2(m||r)/b and sends m′ to S;
9• S computes the blinded signature s′ = K+ y ·m′ and sends it to the user i;
• The user i verifies whether gs′ ?=gy·m′ · δ1. If verification fails, it outputs
abort; otherwise, the user computes s = s′ · b + a and stores (α, β, r, s) as
a valid credential.
– Authentication: The authorized user i and the authentication server S interact
with each other as described below
• The user i computes two k-size sets of commitments (S1, S2, · · · , Sk) =
(gx·s11 , g
x·s2
1 , · · · , gx·sk1 ) and (S1, S2, · · · , Sk) = (gs12 , gs22 , · · · , gsk2 ), where si ∈
Zq for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
• The user i generates the ciphertext Ci = Encmpk({Si, Si}) and sends it to
the authentication server S as an authentication request;
• Upon receiving a request from the user i, S chooses a challenge nonce ci
and sends it to the user i;
• The user i computes R1 = x1 + s1 · ci + s2 · c2i + · · · sk · cki , R2 = x ·R1 and
sends message mi = (R1, R2, α, β, r, s) to S;
• S checks whether H1(α||β) ?=β−s · αH2(H1(α||β)||r) · r and gR21 · gR12 ?=β · Sci1 ·
S
c2i
2 · · ·Sc
k
i
k · S1
ci · S2c
2
i · · ·Skc
k
i . If either of them fails, it outputs abort;
otherwise, it outputs accept.
– Trace: We assume that a specific credential (α, β, r, s) is used by a dishonest
user for k+1 times. Then, S gets k + 1 shares about the secret x1 and x1 · x,
respectively. Once S obtains the values of x1 and x1 · x, S can successfully
compute the user’s secret key x.
4.1 Security Analysis
Theorem 4. The proposed k-RUA achieves user authenticity if the OMDL as-
sumption [4] holds over the underlying group G.
Due to the page limit, the detailed security proof and the subsequent proofs
are deferred to the full version of this work.
Theorem 5. The proposed k-RUA achieves anonymity if the DDH assumption
[8] holds over the underlying group G.
Theorem 6. The proposed k-RUA achieves user privacy if the underlying public
key encryption scheme [8] is IND-CCA secure.
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5 Conclusion
In this work, we have proposed a generic construction of anonymous remote
user authentication with k-times untraceability. We have also defined the formal
security models to achieve certain security requirements that include user au-
thenticity, anonymity and user privacy. We leave the construction of anonymous
and traceable remote user authentication with designated verifier (where autho-
rized users can be authenticated by a designated authentication server only) as
a future work.
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